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Since its launch, the euro has successfully achieved the status of an international 
currency, and the prospect of its ability to challenge the dollar is increasingly credible. 
This paper supplements the ongoing academic discussion by reevaluating the 
characteristics necessary for such a position in light of the most recent information 
available on the euro area, and then providing econometric evidence as support.  I regress 
the lags of shares of dollar and euro reserves on the current shares and predict steady state 
values for each currency. I then regress the same lags, as well as the exchange rate lag, on 
the change in the euro/dollar exchange rate. I find, first, that the share of euro reserves, 
while still not as high as the share of dollars, is nonetheless significant: about 26%.  
Second, the euro/dollar exchange rate is only slightly affected by changes in the share of 
either currency’s reserves. I conclude that confidence in the euro as an alternative 
international currency is growing, and that the euro has become a real challenge to the 
dollar.
1INTRODUCTION 
The launch of the euro has triggered a monumental transformation in the 
international monetary system.  Throughout the eight years of its existence, the euro has 
experienced phases of intense growth and appreciation, as well as suffered interludes of 
weakness.  But even during its low points, the euro has not significantly fallen in the 
international markets.  In fact, it has remained strong enough to possibly finally 
encourage a shift in the monetary system: away from a single international currency and 
towards a multiple reserve system.  The prospect that the euro will come to contest the 
dollar as an alternative international currency is growing more and more plausible. 
 The evolution of the European Union marks a milestone in world history.  Never 
before has a group of sovereign nations agreed to merge into a single economic and 
political unit, giving up significant individual authority in the process.  And yet that is 
what the European Union was successful in creating, establishing not only an integrated 
political system, but also a central European bank to set monetary policy and inaugurate a 
single currency: the euro.  Since its formation, the euro area has been overall very 
successful.  Its economy is one of the world’s largest—second only to that of the United 
States.  The area’s financial markets have likewise become larger and more liquid.  The 
euro comprises a significant share of the world’s central banks’ foreign reserve holdings.  
Currently, 25% of currency reserves held by the central banks are euro-denominated (a 
sizeable increase from the 18% of seven years ago).  The European Central Bank 
supports maintaining price stability as its primary objective, adding to the solidity of the 
currency.  In addition, the current condition of the economy of the United States is 
2creating some unease among investors.  Of notable concern is the rising US current 
account deficit and large external debt.   
 Views on the issue are mixed.  Some maintain that the euro, though successful 
enough since its launch, will not come to actually rival the dollar in the international 
finance field.  The existence of the dollar’s inertia is a great advantage for the currency: 
investors and the public are already so comfortable in using it, and transaction costs for 
the dollar are so low, that there does not necessarily seem to be a reason to diversify so 
soon into a new currency.  Others contend that the European Union is still too 
decentralized, with each member country striving too hard to maintain state authority and 
distinctiveness to completely embrace the new currency.  The reluctance of certain 
member states to adopt the euro—specifically the United Kingdom—is definitely a 
negative factor in euro internationalization.  Several others maintain that the euro will not 
rival the dollar in the near future, but that in the long run such a challenge may eventually 
present itself. 
 Opposite views are held by those economists who believe that it is not unfeasible 
to predict the emergence of the euro as a strong adversary for the dollar.  The growing US 
current account deficit, especially, may soon convince investors to diversify out of a 
currency on which they are losing capital and into a currency of nearly equal strength—
the euro.  Proponents of this view often argue that the reason this has never before been 
witnessed in history is the lack of a strong challenger for the dollar; the euro is the first 
currency to be able to play this role.  Further, several economists have developed models 
that determine the possible future portfolio combinations of currencies, and have 
discovered that the euro should fare noticeably better than it is widely predicted to do. 
3Having gone through much of the literature on the subject, I discovered that most 
of the opinions described are based solely on theories and the conjecture of possible 
scenarios, but without any specific evidence from existing data.  A few of the more recent 
publications do offer numerical proof to support their hypotheses.  It is from examining 
these models that I develop my own econometric framework.  I have chosen to 
concentrate my analysis on the shares of foreign reserves in the holdings of central banks 
and on the euro/dollar exchange rate.  Of all other possible factors to focus on, these 
came up again and again in various scholarly articles, and the data on them available to 
me was rather straightforward to obtain and had a relatively high degree of accuracy.   
This paper supplements the ongoing academic discussion on the euro’s role as an 
international currency by not only reevaluating the characteristics necessary for such a 
position in light of the most recent information available on the euro area, but by then 
focusing on the shares of currency reserves of the world’s central banks and the 
euro/dollar exchange rate more closely and suggesting econometric evidence to support 
the growing ability of the euro to afford a genuine challenge to the dollar.  By studying 
the current reserve shares of euros and dollars based on previous holdings, I am able to 
determine long-run values for both currencies.  As mentioned above, from 1999 to 2006, 
the share of euros has increased by 7%; the share of the dollar—decreased by 6% (from 
71% to 65%).  My long-run values predict consistent growth in the euro share to about 
26%.  I then assess the impact on the appreciation of the euro or dollar through the 
change in the exchange rate brought about by currency reserve holdings.  I find the effect 
of the share of currency reserves to be relative small and felt only after a considerable 
lag.  From these observations, I conclude that the euro has indeed grown strong since its 
4inauguration and has become a larger player in the international finance arena than is 
generally recognized by the public.  I predict that the euro can only continue to become 
more robust and will in fact soon develop into a sizeable rival to the dollar. 
The paper is structured as follows.  First, I relate the history of the European 
Union and the euro.  It is key to understanding the difficulties, as well as the 
accomplishments, of merging several nations’ economies into a monetary union, and then 
instituting a single currency for them all.  It is an entirely new system, and its structure is 
significant to the euro’s performance.  The next section explains economic theories and 
ideas relevant to the discussion.  Particularly, I analyze the role of money in general as 
well as its function as an international currency.  I consider the euro’s accomplishments 
in light of these characteristics, and thus reevaluate its position in the international 
monetary system based on the most recent statistics available.  The third section reviews 
key existing literature on the euro/dollar debate concentrating on those authors whose 
research greatly influenced my own.  In the fourth section, I develop my own 
econometric framework, based on currency reserves and the euro/dollar exchange rate, 
and use it to evaluate the euro’s position to challenge the dollar in the future.  I conclude 
by summarizing my findings and relating them to the existing global economic 
environment.  
The European Union is faced with a great task: to unite its member states into a 
cohesive and integrated political and economic entity that will permit its currency to 
challenge the reigning incumbent.  No equivalent has existed before, and it is not 
implausible to believe that the countries of Europe will be successful in this endeavor. 
Because the countries of Europe, none of them anything but 
second-rate powers by themselves, can, if they get together, be a 
5power in the world, an economic power, a power in foreign policy, 
a power in defence equal to either of the other superpowers.  We 
are in the position of the Greek city states: they fought one another 
and they fell victim to Alexander the Great and then to the 
Romans.  Europe united could still, by not haggling about the size 
of lorries but by having a single foreign policy, a single defence 
policy and a single economic policy, be equal to the great 
superpowers.1
HISTORY 
Launch of the European Union and the Euro 
The history of the European Union can be traced back to post-World War II.  
Determined to rebuild the war-torn nations and to prevent future conflicts, six Western 
European countries formed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952.  
Leaders had realized that the best way to ensure a lasting peace among European nations 
was to unite them both economically and politically.2 As a next step, the same six 
countries—Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands—
established the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EURATOM) through the Treaty of Rome in 1958.  A decade later, the six 
founder member states had achieved most of the aims described in the Treaty, and as a 
result their economies had grown increasingly intertwined.  The EEC had become an 
important trading bloc on the international level as well.3 Soon, the Community 
concluded that economic and monetary union was to be made a formal goal.4
1 Harold MacMillian (British Conservative Prime Minister, 1957-1963), 1979.  
2 Dominguez, 2006, 69. 
3 Coffey, 2001, 3-4. 
4 Dominguez, 2006, 69. 
6Several plans were submitted in 1969 and 1970, describing how the European 
Community (EC), as it was now also called,5 could potentially move toward a monetary 
union. They differed in their views on economic cooperation and coordination, such as 
the fixing of exchange rates or the freedom of capital mobility.6 Finally, the task fell to a 
group chaired by Pierre Werner, the Prime Minister of Luxembourg.  The plan suggested 
both fiscal and monetary union.7 Its key point was to create a mechanism for managing 
currencies, titled the “snake in the tunnel.”  The “snake” was a narrow margin of 
fluctuation for the EC members’ national currencies that was to move within the “tunnel” 
of the wider band of fluctuation for the US dollar.  The margin was reexamined and 
widened after the dollar crisis of 1971.  Still, not all the member states—whose number 
had grown by 1973, to include Denmark, the Republic of Ireland, and the United 
Kingdom—were satisfied with the arrangement.  After only two months, the UK and 
Ireland had left the agreement; they were followed several months later by Italy and soon 
thereafter France.8 As a result, due to continued weakening of the dollar and the oil 
crises of the early 1970s, as well as these differences in member states’ national 
economic policies, the “Snake” system was dropped.9
Renewed efforts, prompted by both France and Germany, to resolve this 
instability resulted in the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979.  
This decision was as much political as it was economic.  Member states were growing 
wary of the inflationary effects of a floating exchange rate, as well as nervous with the 
 
5 The Merger Treaty of 1967 combined the three existing communities: ECSC, EEC, and EURATOM. The 
term European Community (EC) came into use following this Treaty. 
6 Coffey, 2001, 4-8. 
7 Dominguez, 2006, 69. 
8 Coffey, 2001, 11-13. 
9 Dominguez, 2006, 69. 
7monetary policies conducted by the US administration.  The leaders of France and 
Germany did not want to simply establish a joint float against the dollar; instead, they 
preferred a greater economic and political integration within the Community itself.10 
And so the currencies of the EC member states—with the exception of the United 
Kingdom—joined the new exchange rate mechanism (ERM), based on fix but adjustable 
exchange rates.  These were compared to a European unit of account, called the European 
Currency Unit (ECU), which was a weighted average of the nations’ currencies. 11 Each 
currency could fluctuate on either side within 2.25 percent (the Italian lira was allowed a 
margin of 6 percent) against bilateral central parity rates calculated on the basis of the 
ECU.  As a nation’s currency neared the margin, its central bank was to preserve the 
parity through open market operations.12 Thus, the EMS also stressed adjusting monetary 
and economic policies as a tool to achieve necessary stability.  As monetary stability 
increased and capital controls were less stringent throughout the zone, member states 
with high inflationary rates were able to implement disinflation policies.  Overall 
economic performance was steadily increasing.13 
Further efforts to integrate several European states into an economic and 
monetary union resulted in the 1986 creation of the Single European Act (SEA).  
Between 1981 and 1986, three countries had joined the European Community: Greece, 
Portugal, and Spain. The Act created a single market.14 It also established a deadline—
the end of 1992—for the elimination of barriers and restrictions on the movement of 
 
10 Coffey, 2001, 14. 
11 Dominguez, 2006, 69. 
12 Lairson and Skidmore, 2003, 170. 
13 Scheller, 2006, 19. 
14 ECB, 2006, 5. 
8capital, goods, and people.15 Policy-makers agreed that a market without internal borders 
would help to unite national economies: individual policies for the national economies 
would have to fall to second place behind the policy for all member states.  The idea of a 
single currency was also brought up.  With greater integration, a single currency would 
act to eliminate exchange rate risks, reduce costs, increase transparency, and generally 
help the economic welfare of the European Community.16 
It was also becoming evident toward the late 1980s that the role of Germany—
and especially that of its central bank, the Bundesbank—was increasingly key to the 
success of the EMS.17 Germany had a large economy that grew even bigger with the 
unification brought about after the fall of the Berlin Wall.  In addition, the Bundesbank 
was resolutely concerned with fighting inflation and working to keep its currency 
strong.18 As a result, Germany’s central bank was very active in setting the monetary 
policy for Europe as a whole, which troubled other member states, especially France.  In 
1989, the European Council set up a committee, chaired by Jacques Delors, the President 
of the European Commission, to explore ways in which a monetary union could be more 
effectively achieved.  The Delors Report outlined three stages of a plan to establish a 
monetary union.  Each stage followed a precise timetable.  In addition, it suggested the 
creation of an independent institution that would be responsible for the common 
monetary policy.19 This formed the basis for the Treaty on European Union. 
This Treaty was signed on February 7, 1992, in Maastricht, Netherlands.  With 
the Maastricht Treaty, as it is most commonly known, the European Community adopted 
 
15 Lairson and Skidmore, 2003, 166. 
16 Scheller, 2006, 20. 
17 Lairson and Skidmore, 2003, 171. 
18 Wyplosz, 1997, 5. 
9the name “European Union” (EU) to reflect both an economic and political union.  The 
Treaty amended previous treaties, for example adding a chapter on economic and 
monetary policy. But most importantly, by drawing on and slightly amending the Delors 
Report, the Treaty outlined a timetable for three definitive stages towards a monetary 
union.  Though the Maastricht Treaty was meant to enter into force at the start of 1993, 
due to delays in the ratification process from the side of Germany and Denmark, the 
Treaty actually came into effect towards the end of 1993.20 
Stage One involved achieving a single European market by removing all internal 
boundaries to the movement of people, goods and services, and capital within the 
member states.21 The Delors Report had decided that this stage was to begin in the 
summer of 1990.22 In addition to a single market, the first stage further separated 
nations’ central banks and their governments.  As a result, services between banks and 
public authorities were limited.  For example, banks were no longer allowed to grant 
overdraft facilities to public authorities.23 The first stage lasted through 1993. 
Stage Two began in 1994, with the establishment of the European Monetary 
Institute (EMI) in Frankfurt, Germany.  Member states were to continue working towards 
a stronger economic convergence in their monetary and fiscal policies.  The EMI was 
meant to help in the cooperation among the central banks.24 A second task of the EMI 
was to take the necessary preemptive steps to allow for the eventual introduction of a 
single currency.  Preparatory work was carried out concerning the exchange rate 
 
19 Dominguez, 2006, 70. 
20 Scheller, 2006, 21. 
21 ECB, 2006, 5. 
22 Scheller, 2006, 22. 
23 Dominguez, 2006, 70. 
24 Dominguez, 2006, 70. 
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relationships between the future single currency and currencies outside the EU.  In late 
1996, the EMI presented a report that established the fundamental elements of a new 
exchange rate mechanism, also known as ERM II, which was adopted the following year.  
Member states began to implement policies that would allow them to meet the 
“convergence criteria” necessary for them to enter into Stage Three of the EMU.25 By 
1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden had joined the European Union, bringing the total 
number of members to 15.26 Of these 15 members, the EMI had decided that 11 had 
successfully fulfilled the criteria and would be permitted to enter the third stage. Finally, 
in the summer of 1998, the EMI was liquidated, being replaced by the European Central 
Bank (ECB).27 
On January 1, 1999, Stage Three of the EMU officially began.  The conversion 
rates of the currencies of the 11 member states meeting the convergence criteria—
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain—were irrevocably fixed.28 All these nations accepted the 
euro as their single currency.  The European Central Bank was delegated all 
responsibility for conducting the now single monetary policy in the euro area.29 A
transitional period was implemented.  From the start of 1999 until December 31, 2001, all 
agents denominating claims and liabilities or carrying out cashless transactions were 
permitted to use either the euro or the national currencies.  In 2001, the number of 
member states participating in the euro grew to 12 with the addition of Greece.  Finally, 
 
25 Scheller, 2006, 22-24. 
26 ECB, 2006, 5. 
27 Scheller, 2006, 25. 
28 See Appendix, Table 1. 
29 ECB, 2006, 6. 
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on January 1, 2002, euro banknotes and coins were put into circulation.  As of the end of 
February 2002, the euro is the sole legal tender of the member states.30 
Convergence Criteria 
 The Maastricht Treaty outlines several criteria that member states must meet and 
agreements they must consent to before being permitted to join the single currency.  A 
“Stability and Growth Pact” was agreed to by every nation entering the euro zone.  The 
pact was designed to prevent member governments from engaging in deficit spending.  
The agreement itself is relatively rigid and restricts the extent to which a government may 
conduct fiscal policies.31 The Stability Pact went into effect at the start of January 1999, 
along with the launch of the euro.  It was designed to help the euro maintain its value.  
Participating countries were to form stability programs intended to promote budgetary 
discipline. They were to set medium-term objectives for the budget as a ratio of their 
GDP, to develop measures to achieve these objectives, and make assumptions on 
expected economic growth, unemployment, and inflation.32 
But before a country in the European Union was allowed to adopt the euro and 
participate in the euro zone, the European Council had to conclude that it met the four 
necessary “convergence criteria”.  This process was meant to ensure that only those 
countries with economic policies successfully working towards and focused on stability 
would be allowed to engage in the third stage of the monetary union.33 If countries enter 
a single currency in different fiscal and monetary positions, the currency will prove to be 
 
30 Scheller, 2006, 25-27. 
31 Coffey, 2001, 40.  
32 Cowgill, 2004, “Stability Pact”. 
33 ECB, 2006, 6.  
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unsustainable.34 The first criterion focused on price stability.  A country’s inflation rate 
was to be within 1.5 percent of the average inflation rate, which was measured with a 
consumer price index, of the three lowest rates in the EU.35 The second condition dealt 
with low and stable long-term interest rates.  A country’s rates were not to exceed by 
more than 2 percent the interest rates of the three countries with the lowest expected 
inflation.36 Third, the nation’s exchange rate was to also be stable, remaining within the 
bands established by the exchange rate mechanism (implying participation in ERM II) for 
at least two years, and not devaluing against currencies of any other member states.37 
The fourth criterion dealt with a country’s fiscal policy.  The member states were 
required to maintain sound public finances in two areas: the government budget deficit to 
GDP ratio could not exceed 3 percent, and the government debt to GDP ratio could not 
exceed 60 percent at market prices.38 After a country had met the fourth criterion and 
joined the euro zone, it was to maintain its fiscal policy, adhering to the Stability and 
Growth Pact.39 
Eleven of the fifteen members of the European Union met the convergence 
criteria in 1998, and were allowed to adopt the euro in 1999.  However, a country that did 
not initially qualify might aim to better satisfy the criteria and join at a later point.  Thus, 
Greece became the twelfth member of the euro zone in 2001, having fulfilled the 
necessary criteria.  In contrast, Sweden had not fulfilled all necessary criteria.  A 2003 
 
34 Wyplosz, 1997, 7. 
35 Dominguez, 2006, 75. 
36 Wyplosz, 1997, 7. 
37 Dominguez, 2006, 75. 
38 Cowgill, 2004, “Criteria for the Single Currency”. 
39 Soon after its launch, however, several nations in the euro zone were in violation of the public debt rule 
of the Stability and Growth Pact.  No fines were imposed; instead, the Pact was revised in 2005 in order to 
allow more flexibility for those countries undergoing reforms or business cycle recessions (Dominguez, 
2006, 76). 
13
Swedish referendum found that 56% of citizens were against adopting the common 
currency (42% were in favor).  Sweden’s decision of whether or not to join the euro zone 
has now become mostly political.40 Essentially, the Swedish government is provided 
with a sort of formal loophole: by remaining outside the exchange rate mechanism (the 
ERM II), it avoids the third criterion to adopting the euro.   
Denmark and the United Kingdom were the other two member states that declined 
to adopt the euro at the formal launch of Stage Three at the start of 1999.  Neither country 
wished to participate in the monetary union and each was therefore granted an “opt-out” 
clause through the Maastricht Treaty.  Denmark had originally rejected the Treaty in 
1992, and the clause was put in place in order to persuade the member state to accept it.  
Later, in 2000, Denmark was the first EU state to be given a chance to vote on whether or 
not to adopt the single currency.  53.1 percent of voters rejected adherence to the euro 
area (46.9% were in favor). 41 Even if Denmark were to fulfill the four convergence 
criteria, under the clause it is not forced to automatically proceed to the third stage of the 
EMU.  The Danish krone, however, is part of ERM II and is pegged to the euro, allowing 
for a fluctuation of 2.25 percent on either side of the euro.42 Similarly, the leaders of the 
United Kingdom negotiated an opt-out clause that allowed them to remain a member 
state of the European Union, but did not force them to join the EMU.  The clause allows 
these countries to retain existing powers in the scope of monetary policy according to 
their national laws.  This perk is one of the main arguments against accepting the euro: 
 
40 BBC News, 2003, “EU regrets Sweden’s vote on euro”.  
41 CNN, 2000, “Denmark rejects single European Currency”. 
42 Europa, 2006, “Denmark: EMU opt-out clause”. 
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conservative nationalists in the United Kingdom retain a strong commitment to the 
preservation of British sovereignty.43 
At the current time—beginning of 2007—the European Union is comprised of 27 
member states.  Of these, 13 are part of the euro zone (Slovenia having joined on January 
1, 2007), six are in the ERM II but not yet the euro zone and all the rest are not even a 
part of the exchange rate mechanism. 
 
ECONOMIC THEORIES 
Roles of Money 
 Money generally serves three purposes.  First, it is a store of value.  It is used as a 
means to “transfer purchasing power from the present to the future.”  Second, it is a unit 
of account.  It is the instrument through which prices and debts are referenced.  It 
measures economic transactions.  Third, money is used as a medium of exchange.  It is 
required to purchase goods and services.44 But money is not used exclusively in one 
country. 
 An international currency is defined as a currency “that is used outside its home 
country.”45 Similar to the functions of money domestically, international money serves 
six roles, divided among private behavior and official (the decisions of countries’ central 
banks).  Several economists, such as Paul Krugman, have set up a table to illustrate these 
 
43 Lairson and Skidmore, 2003, 174. 
44 Mankiw, 2003, 76-77. 
45 Frankel, 2000, 98. 
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capacities.46 A currency acts as a store of value when—in the “banking” role—private 
actors use it to hold their liquid assets, or as a “reserve” currency when it is held in 
central banks.  It can also be considered a unit of account when it is an “invoice” 
currency, such as when a currency is used to denominate trade contracts, or as a “peg”, 
when other countries fix their domestic currency’s exchange rate to the other currency.  
Finally, a currency serves as a medium of exchange when it is employed in private 
transactions, acting as a “vehicle”, or when it is bought and sold by the central banks, 
acting as an “intervention.”47 
International Currency 
 It is certainly advantageous for a country’s currency to hold an important position 
in the global economy.  Most obviously, it is a benefit for that nation’s residents—for 
those people actually dealing with the money.  It is far more convenient to carry out 
transactions in one’s own currency.48 For private parties, these conveniences translate 
into three distinct areas: market barriers, transaction costs, and liquidity.  Market barriers 
are lowered or eliminated altogether for the issuer when other individuals within the 
market are using its currency.  As a currency becomes more internationalized and more 
parties use it in their transactions, economies of scale arise and the average cost of each 
transaction declines (to the currency’s issuer) with their increased number.  Liquidity—
“the ability to carry out a transaction whenever [one wants to] without incurring extra 
cost”—will also be higher the greater the number of transactions in the market.49 
46 See Appendix, Table 2.  
47 Krugman, 1992, 167-168. 
48 Chinn, 2006, 6-8. 
49 Cooper, 2000, 179-180. 
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Next, it is apparent that using a certain country’s currency would bring in more 
traffic for its domestic banks and institutions, granting them a comparative advantage 
over others.50 Although it is not necessary that a bank use its own national currency for 
most of its transactions, banks whose domestic currency is widely used internationally do 
have a safety net that is afforded by the country’s regulatory authorities.51 Further, the 
issuer of a global currency can be the “only true international lender of last resort.”52 
A country that has its currency used internationally also holds the advantage of 
seigniorage: “the implicit transfer, equivalent to an interest-free loan, that goes to the 
issuer of money that is widely used and held abroad”.  An international currency can be 
thought of as “a claim that might never be exercised” because it has the potential to 
indefinitely remain in foreign circulation.  Consequently, the issuer of the currency is 
able to procure large amounts of goods and services from the rest of the world at very 
low cost.53 In order for a nation to hold another country’s currency, it “must give up real 
goods and services, or ownership of the real capital stock.”  As a result, the country with 
the international currency is able to amass debts in its own currency at a lower interest 
rate.  The more other nations choose to purchase that currency, the more they are 
financing that country’s current account deficit, and so the more that it can stand to 
borrow. 54 Further, the privilege of financing external deficits with one’s own currency 
protects the country from exchange-rate risk.55 It also allows the issuer greater flexibility 
in the management of its macroeconomic policy.  There is less constraint due to worries 
 
50 Chinn, 2006, 6-8. 
51 Frankel, 2000,104. 
52 Portes, 2000, 2. 
53 Cohen, 2003, 577. 
54 Chinn, 2006, 6-8. 
55 Portes, 2000, 2. 
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about the stability of balance-of-payments that may result from pursuing international 
economic ambitions.56 
Finally, there is a level of political power associated with being the key-currency 
country.  There is the advantage of high status and prestige generated by market 
dominance.  Being the issuer of a key global currency results in a symbol of near 
hegemony or “soft power”: “the ability to exercise influence by shaping beliefs and 
perceptions.”  It is considered highly impressive for a country’s currency to be so 
successful and widely accepted.  Secondly, the issuing nation (or union) experiences 
direct political power that results from the countries that are monetarily dependent on it.  
The issuer is not only insulated from outside pressures and coercion on its domestic 
policy, but is in fact in the prime position to pursue its own foreign policy objectives, 
possibly even exercising some influence or coercion of its own internationally.57 
Yet there are also drawbacks to having the strongest international currency.  
Economists Menzie Chinn and Jeffrey Frankel suggest three reasons why countries 
would be reluctant to internationalize their currencies.  First, it does not necessarily 
follow that having other countries hold one’s currency will lead to a “greater variability 
of demand” for it.  By joining the foreign exchange market, a country would be allowing 
the demand for its currency to be reflected in its exchange rate, which can be dangerous.  
A second problem deals with the potential increase in demand for the currency.  If 
foreign residents purchase assets in the country’s currency, it is possible for it to 
appreciate and thus make exports less competitive.  Third, holding a key currency brings 
on a level of responsibility.  The decisions made by the institutions and authorities in the 
 
56 Cohen, 2003, 578. 
57 Cohen, 2003, 578. 
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home country will have some degree of an effect on the world market.  As a result, they 
must consider a much broader objective, rather than focusing solely on domestic 
monetary policy motives.58 
It has been argued that having a system which relies on a single currency is not as 
stable as a multiple reserve system.  When one country’s currency is the unrivaled 
international currency, the home government may be tempted to exploit some of the 
advantages described above, such as running deficits at the expense of other nations.  “In 
this view, the existence of a second international currency creates a healthy rivalry that 
keeps both governments in line.”59 Thus, the emergence of the euro as an international 
currency rival to the dollar may result in a steadier international system. 
 
The Euro as an International Currency 
 Economists propose several main characteristics that should be used in 
determining whether a currency can be considered an international currency.  The dollar 
already satisfies all of these, and is considered the dominant global currency.  It is 
important, then, to analyze to what extent the euro measures up to the dollar in these 
characteristics.  If the euro can be credited as an international currency, it becomes 
possible to question whether it can compete with and eventually surpass the dollar as the 
strongest global currency. 
One factor is the country’s “size of its underlying economy and global trade.”60 
Obviously, a currency in a country that has a significant role in international output, 
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trade, and finance will have a natural advantage over others.61 A study conducted by 
Eichengreen and Frankel found that “a rise of 1 percentage point in a key currency 
country’s share of world product is associated with a rise of 1.33 percentage points in that 
currency’s share of central bank reserves.”62 As of 2005, the GDP of the European 
Monetary Union was reported as $9.8 trillion, whereas that of the United States—$12.5   
trillion.63 The US economy still remains the world’s largest.  The euro area has the 
world’s second largest economy.64 Still, the two areas are close enough in size that they 
can be considered comparable.  In fact, the EU has started catching up.  As a recent issue 
of The Economist reports: “In 2006 GDP in the EU as whole grew by 2.9% and in the 
euro area by 2.7%. In the fourth quarter of last year the euro area’s GDP growth 
outstripped America’s for the first time in five years.”65 And as more countries join the 
European Union, the economic area will expand, as will the area’s population.   
A second criterion explores the history of the currency.  If it has been used for an 
extended period of time, individuals and banks are more inclined to continue to use it.  
For example “the pound remained an important international currency even after the 
United Kingdom lost its position as an economic superpower early in the century.”66 The 
euro was introduced only in 1999—relatively recently—and therefore the dollar has been 
the dominant global currency for a long time.  “An incumbent international 
currency…has a built-in advantage when competing to retain its status.”67 One 
explanation for this is that it is expensive to change from one money to another due to the 
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costly process of financial adaptation.  A new currency will start being used more often if 
“others appear likely to make extensive use of it too,” thereby making it cost-effective to 
adopt.68 Another reason is that there is uncertainty associated with the emergence of a 
new global currency.  Many actors are risk-averse and will opt to minimize any anxiety 
by continuing to work with the currency they have used in the past.  Once a currency has 
gained a high level of acceptance among actors, it will continue to be the dominant one 
even amid the appearance of powerful competitors, simply because it has regularly been 
used in the past.  “Even after America’s emergence as the world’s richest economy, it 
took literally decades for the greenback to ascend to top rank among currencies.”69 
A third factor deals with the country’s financial markets.  It is important that 
“capital and money markets must be not only open and free of controls, but also well-
developed, deep, and liquid.”70 Having deep and liquid financial markets is important in 
allowing holders to diversify.71 They also help to keep transaction costs low, thereby 
encouraging more people to use them.72 By 2005, the euro has demonstrated good 
performance in financial markets, becoming larger and more liquid.  For example, its 
share in international bond issuance has been relatively close to the dollar.73 The Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS) in its 2004 (the latest) Triennial Central Bank Survey 
reported that “dollar/euro continued to be by far the most traded currency pair in April 
2004, capturing 28% of global turnover.”74 However, the European financial markets are 
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highly decentralized.75 Unlike the United States with its large financial market in New 
York, and the United Kingdom—in London—the European Union has no central 
financial market, which is a detriment to the euro. 
A fourth factor to note is that of “the posture of the authorities.”76 The system of 
the issuing currency can decide the extent to which they will focus on internationalizing 
their currency.  For example, Germany’s Bundesbank was so concerned with domestic 
monetary policy control that it “systematically discouraged an international role for the 
D-mark during much of the postwar period.”77 The Maastricht Treaty identifies the 
primary objective of the European Central Bank as that of maintaining price stability; 
economic growth is a second objective.  And the ECB has stated in a monthly bulletin: 
…[T]he international role of the euro is mainly determined by the 
decision of market participants in a context of increasing 
integration and liberalisation of product and capital markets 
world-wide.  The Eurosystem therefore adopts a neutral stance, 
neither hindering nor fostering the international use of its 
currency.78 
Still, argues Charles Wyplosz: “The potential for the euro to replace the U.S. dollar as the 
world’s premier currency is one of the understated motivations of the EMU.”79 The 
Bundesbank had a strong influence on the development of the EU’s monetary policy, 
tending to restrain the use of the euro.  But as the euro area expands in its economic size, 
the ECB’s concern for monetary control may ease and the euro’s role as a global 
currency may become more prominent.80 
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Fifth, and very important, is the confidence in the value of the currency.  The 
currency must be relatively stable.  This will reduce the risk of holding assets 
denominated in it.  The lower the risk, the more willing investors will be to hold reserves 
and assets in that currency.  Again, “the Maastricht Treaty’s emphasis on price stability 
assures a reasonably firm monetary policy, and a stable unit of value.”81 Similarly, it is 
important to have a strong exchange rate.  This, again, will reduce the risk of losing 
capital to those who hold assets denominated in the currency.82 Inflation needs to remain 
low to convince individuals of the currency’s strong value.  The United States has 
become a very large debtor nation.  This raises fears and increases the risk in holding 
dollars.83 If the euro is the alternative international currency, individuals will be more 
willing to invest their money in the euro currency, as opposed to dollars.   
The euro can certainly be classified as an international currency. What becomes 
critical, then, is to explore to what extent it is coming to rival the dollar.  “The 
international use of the euro as a trade, investment, anchor, and reserve currency has 
increased considerably.”84 Given the inherent difficulties for a new international 
currency, as well as the current dominance of the role by the dollar, how strong is the 
euro’s position to rival the dollar at the present time, and what more is it necessary for the 
euro to achieve in order to ever be able to do so?  
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Opinions on the Euro’s Ability to Dominate as the Global Currency 
 
Even before its official start, economists and other scholars have been analyzing 
the prospects and consequences of a European monetary union.  This has become 
increasingly the case after the inception of the European Union and the launch of the 
euro.  Because no equivalent situation has existed before, economists can only at most 
speculate of the future of the euro and its ramifications on the rest of the global economy. 
The literature available on this topic is sizeable and broad.  There are nearly as 
many supporters of the euro and its ability to rival and surpass the dollar as the dominant 
global currency as there are skeptics and those who say the euro is either not strong 
enough to do so yet, or even that it can never happen.  Though it is impossible to mention 
them all here, it is nevertheless important to review the leading literature on the subject.  
Several economists—Jeffrey Frankel, Menzie Chinn, Hélène Rey, Richard Portes, 
George Alogoskoufis, Kathryn Dominguez, Benjamin Cohen, Fred Bergsten, Barry 
Eichengreen, and Richard Cooper—have written extensively on this topic, and their 
articles have surfaced often and have been of great assistance to this paper.  These are the 
ones reviewed here. 
The economist Benjamin Cohen, upon reviewing the euro’s performance four 
years after its launch, presents a skeptical assessment of its ability to come to rival the 
dollar.  Having discussed the euro’s performance thus far, he offers four interrelated 
reasons for his dim prognosis.   First is the characteristic of inertia, which he further 
divides into the “pre-existence of already well-established transactional networks, which 
generate a well-documented stickiness in user preferences” and the “exceptionally high 
24
level of uncertainty inherent in any choice between alternative monies.”85 Next, is the 
high cost of conducting any business in euros, which he considers is unlikely to fall 
considerably lower than transactions costs for the dollar.  Third, Cohen mentions that 
“anti-growth bias built into EMU” will negatively affect yields on euro-denominated 
assets.86 Finally, he argues that the structure of the monetary union is too ambiguous, 
which will lead to confusion and doubt among the future users of the euro.  He concludes 
that although the euro will be the leader in the region, reduce outside shocks with the help 
of the resulting regional stability, and “surely enhance Europe’s sense of its own 
identity,” it will not emerge as the second global currency.87 
A somewhat similar view is presented by Richard Cooper.  He, too, does not 
believe that the euro will soon come to rival the dollar as a major international currency.  
More specifically, he predicts (as the article was written in 2000, only one year following 
the official launch of the euro but before the currency was put into circulation), that 
although the euro will be a symbol of monetary history and will certainly require 
alterations within the European system, it will not affect the international monetary 
system for many decades, “and in particular the international uses of the US dollar.”88 
His reasoning is based on the fact that network externalities exist that result from the 
experience and ease of using the dollar because it is so widespread, and that the euro so 
far functions mostly as a unit of account than an instrument for investment.  As he argues, 
“having a common currency does not by itself assure a widely accepted and liquid store 
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of value.”89 He expects the euro to eventually become an important international 
currency, but that the process will be very slow, and that the euro will “supplement rather 
than directly displace the dollar in its diverse international roles.”90 
An analogous argument is presented in an article by Barry Eichengreen, though 
his was written even before the launch of the euro, in 1998.  He concentrates his attention 
on the euro’s role as a reserve currency.  Relying on the contention of the importance of 
history and incumbency (a topic for which he is well-known) and the institutional 
structure of markets, Eichengreen presents historical support and then econometric 
evidence to suggest that the “dollar will continue to dominate international reserves for 
some time, absent economic mismanagement in the United States.”91 He deducts that the 
desirability to hold euros as a reserve currency will depend on how widely the currency is 
used for other international transactions more generally and whether the European 
Central Bank will be interested in day-to-day liquidity management and be prepared to 
accept lender-of-last-resort operations. 
Still, not all economists share the views of those just mentioned.  Richard Portes 
and Hélène Rey in an article written even longer ago—in 1997—argue in favor of the 
euro.  They explore the effects of hegemony, seigniorage, and welfare, and then go on to 
build several analytical scenarios to offer specific estimates of the consequences of the 
euro: the “Pan Euro Scenario”, the “Medium Euro Scenario”, and the “Big Euro 
Scenario.”  They provide numerical estimates of the foreign exchange market, the bond 
market, and welfare analysis.  Those scenarios in which the euro shares international 
currency status seem very plausible to the authors.  Especially if the ECB chooses to 
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“actively promote the international use of the euro, one cannot discount the possibility of 
an overt tug of war between the euro, the incumbent (the dollar) and the major other 
contender (the yen) for international monetary supremacy.”92 They conclude that the 
scale of the shock brought to the international monetary system is the key, and that it will 
most likely be large and sudden.  As a result, authorities and those participating in the 
markets will more seriously approach the possibility of a euro rival to the dollar, which 
will permit the “global integration of financial markets” to transition to the euro faster 
than history has insinuated.93 
Analogous results are reached in a 1997 paper by George Alogoskoufis and 
Richard Portes.  The authors “examine the prospective implications of the creation of the 
euro for the international monetary system.”94 They first consider the various roles of the 
euro as an international currency: a means of payment, unit of account, and store of 
value—and how these roles will develop.  Secondly, they concentrate on the effects on 
the short run and long run exchange rate between the dollar and the euro as a result of the 
EMU.  The authors predict that the launch of the euro in financial markets in 1999 will 
disturb the dollar’s role as a major international currency.  These effects will be the 
results of portfolio shifts favoring “a sharp appreciation of the new currency vis-à-vis the 
dollar.”95 Initially, the current account surplus of the European Union will increase, 
leading to an overshooting of the long-run equilibrium of the euro’s exchange rate.  After 
a while, a revaluation of the euro will result in a current account deficit and greater 
inflow of capital into the EU, increasing euro holdings around the world.  Eventually, the 
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euro will weaken towards long-run equilibrium.  Again, major change can occur only 
with the willingness of the ECB to allow the euro to act as an international currency. 
Fred Bergsten in 1997, considering the possible impact on international markets 
from the emergence of the euro, concludes that the United States will encounter strong 
economic competition from the European currency.  He, like many others, cites the 
importance of inertia in international finance.  He also believes that the European Central 
Bank, through its mandate of price stability, is setting up the euro for a strong beginning.  
Bergsten then goes on to analyze five key factors establishing a currency in a global role, 
and the euro’s potential function in each.  And though he cites that widespread belief that 
a shift from dollars into euros would require a long period of time, he holds that “there is 
evidence from the history of major currencies that major shocks can produce rapid 
changes in portfolio composition.”96 In another article eight years later, he reviews the 
success of the euro over its first five years and considers how this has changed the global 
currency situation.  Here, however, he concentrates on the question of whether and when 
the euro will actually be able to replace the dollar’s hegemony.  He specifically 
highlights: “It is thus clear that the euro provides the first real competition for the dollar 
since the latter’s ascent to global currency dominance.”97 He cites four key variables that 
would strengthen the euro sufficiently enough for it to take on this role.  He then 
considers four reasons for a continued appreciation of the exchange rate of the euro 
against the dollar, and ends with the resulting policy implications.   
It would seem that earlier commentaries lacked the necessary evidence to 
correctly predict the future of the euro or to evaluate its achievements, and that it was due 
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to this reason that the views varied considerably.  However, even those articles written 
more recently—sometime during 2006— diverge somewhat in their opinions of the 
euro’s strength.  Kathryn Dominguez, for example, agrees that the euro has enjoyed some 
success, but argues that “a strong case can be made that European monetary union has 
thus far proven to be no more than the sum of its parts.”98 A main, underlying issue is 
that almost each country within the group agreeing to economic integration actually 
wants to remain largely as it was before the process.  The distribution of power among 
those making decisions regarding Europe’s monetary policy and then implementing it are 
very decentralized.  She recounts the history of the European Union, focusing primarily 
on the structure, objectives, and powers of the European Central Bank.  Next, she reviews 
the euro’s global role and determines that it has not been strong enough to appropriate the 
dollar’s position.  Dominguez cites that the euro’s role as a reserve currency is still 
evolving, and that the greatest increase in the use of euros occurred as a result of a larger 
portion of international debt being denominated in euros.  Still, she argues, the euro is 
hindered by the “hesitation on the part of euro-zone countries themselves to embrace 
their newly created currency.”99 The true test of the euro, therefore, she feels is still to 
come, as is the extent of the ECB’s influence. 
 Menzie Chinn and Jeffrey Frankel, also writing in 2006, have a more optimistic 
vision of the euro’s ability to rival the dollar.  They believe the euro has been relatively 
successful since its launch, and that in fact it has “passed the most fundamental tests: the 
transition was relatively smooth, 12 countries today use the euro (and only the euro), and 
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the new currency has entered into international use as well.”100 The authors then describe 
advantages and disadvantages of an international currency, as well as a brief history of 
the dollar’s ascent into this role.  In the paper, Chinn and Frankel choose to concentrate 
on the euro’s role as a reserve currency, estimating the effects of inertia and other factors 
they consider significant: size of the home country, inflation rate, exchange rate 
variability, and the turnover in the currency’s foreign exchange market.  One finding 
shows that the functional form is non-linear.  Another indicates that changes are felt, but 
only with a long lag.   
In order to extrapolate these findings into the future, the authors generate four 
possible scenarios.  The first two show the effects of various combinations of growth in 
the US or European economies.  The third case incorporates Sweden and Denmark as 
part of the euro area, and the fourth includes the UK as well.  For each of these, they 
consider four possibilities for exchange rate depreciation.  They conclude that “the euro 
gains overwhelming dominance in the instance where the UK joins the euro and rapid 
depreciation persists indefinitely.  In this combination, the switchover occurs in 2020 and 
eventually the euro accounts for more than 80% of combined USD and EUR 
holdings.”101 Their prediction for the euro dominating the dollar’s role as a global 
currency involve two important factors. First, that enough EU members join the euro so 
that its economy can become larger than that of the US, especially if the UK joins, 
bringing its large financial markets.  Second, that US macroeconomic policy may 
potentially decrease confidence in the dollar due to resulting inflation and depreciation. 
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Finally, Richard Portes, along with Elias Papaioannou and Gregorios Siourounis, 
consider the impact of the euro and the outlook for the dollar in relation to optimal 
currency shares in international reserves.  Like Chinn and Frankel, these authors 
concentrate on the composition of central banks’ foreign exchange reserve holdings.  By 
developing a “dynamic mean-variance currency portfolio optimizer”, the authors are able 
to “obtain the optimal portfolio composition of central banks’ foreign exchange reserves 
for the eleven years surrounding the introduction of the euro in 1999.”102 They study 
specifically five main currencies: dollar, euro, Swiss franc, pound sterling, and yen.  They 
compare these findings to pre-1999 optimum allocation for the French franc, the 
Deutsche mark, and the Dutch gilder.  Finally, they present simulations of four large 
emerging market countries—Brazil, Russia, India, and China—with limitations signaling 
the variations in a central bank’s preference to hold shares in the currencies of its peg, its 
foreign debt, and its international trade.  The three main results are that the optimizer can 
correspond with the large share of dollar reserves; that the optimum portfolios show a 
lower weight for the euro than is currently being observed, signifying the euro’s already 
“enhanced role” as an international currency; and three factors that would increase the 
optimal euro shares.103 
I found the literature above to be especially key in my research.  Many of the 
theoretical definitions of an international currency and explanations of its role in the 
international monetary system were helpful in understanding the importance of the 
euro/dollar debate.  It was especially useful to note the factors that were brought up often 
and by various authors, such as the effect of history on the role of the euro as an 
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international currency and its importance in whether or not the euro could come to 
challenge the dollar.  The models developed by the economists, particularly those which 
focused on the composition of central banks’ foreign reserves, helped me to develop the 
framework necessary to later design my own models.  Further, by reviewing which 
aspects of the euro’s influence were only moderately considered, I am able to expand my 
research into that field. 
Unfortunately, as it is clear from this evidence, most of the literature currently 
available on the euro-dollar debate is vague.  Though economists may ardently predict 
outlooks in one direction or another, their support is relatively limited.  Also, it is usually 
based more on economic theory than on econometric evidence culled from actual 
numerical data.  This can understandably be attributed to the fact that the euro is still a 
comparatively new currency, having existed for only eight years.  The more recent 
publications address some of these concerns by providing models that do provide some 
estimations or simulations.  Consequently, this paper will expand the topic with a related 
method by approaching the question from two specific angles.  Due to their evident 
significance in determining the euro’s potential as the next great international currency, 
and in the relative straightforwardness of obtaining the necessary data, I will concentrate 




ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK AND RESULTS 
Currency Reserves 
As was explained earlier, banks use money as a store of value by holding 
reserves.  Typically, the larger the bank—for example, a country’s central bank—the 
more the variety of international currencies it will hold.  Banks diversify their reserve 
holdings to hedge risk.  Thus, the amount of euros held by central banks is an important 
measure of its role as an international currency.  Foreign exchange reserves are gaining 
importance in the international financial market.104 The IMF Annual Report describes, at 
the end of 2005, that 98 percent of nongold assets were foreign exchange reserves.105 
The report also provides data on central banks’ holdings of the various currencies.  A 
broad range of annual data for currency reserves is available.  
 
Data 
Central banks of countries around the world report their reserve currency data to 
the International Monetary Fund.  It is then published in the IMF COFER (Currency 
Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves) tables. Unfortunately, this data is 
not complete.  “Countries that do not report the currency composition of their reserves to 
the IMF account for a large (and growing) share of global reserves.”106 The IMF used to 
estimate reserves for non-reporting countries, but now leaves them out altogether.107 
Further, the IMF data tables are not country-specific.  They are simply divided into three 
categories: all countries, developed countries, and developing countries.  Individual 
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central banks regard their currency holdings as “highly confidential.”108 But even the “all 
countries” category does not include most East Asian economies, since the compliance 
with reporting there has tended to be low.  Unfortunately, not only do these countries 
hold a large portion of total foreign reserves, “but anecdotal evidence suggests that they 
overly invest in dollar assets.”109 Finally, the numbers are often inconsistent from one 
Annual Report to the next, especially among less developed nations which have generally 
“incorporated much more estimation of the reserve composition.”110 Specifically, the 
discrepancies begin with 2003 data.111 This, of course, limits any econometric analysis. 
From this data it is immediately evident that the euro is slowly growing in its 
position as a reserve currency.112 Though its percentage of total reserves averages around 
the 20s, compared to the dollar’s in the 60s, the euro has nonetheless been successful 
since its introduction: 
After adding to their dollar reserves at a disproportionate pace in 
2003 and 2004 as the soaring dollar value of their existing euro 
reserves increased the euro’s share in their portfolio, central banks 
did the opposite in 2005—buying euros as the euro fell versus the 
dollar to maintain the euro’s overall share in their portfolio.113 
Into the beginning of 2006, the amount of euro reserves held continues to grow; that of 
dollars—to decrease slightly.  In 1999, the share of dollars averaged 71.18%; the share of 
euros—18.00%.  By the third quarter of 2006, the share of dollars has fallen to 65.62%, 
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while that of the euros has grown to 25.22%.  Interestingly, developing countries hold a 
larger percentage of their reserves in euros, as opposed to developed nations.114 
The data used in the following regressions ranges from the first quarter of 1999—
the start of Stage Three of the EMU—to the most recently updated third quarter of 
2006115. The data is quarterly, as this is how it is available from the IMF’s COFER 
tables.  Because the IMF does not delineate this data by countries, I opted to use the 
figures presented under “all countries”, as I felt that they would provide the most 
inclusive results.  Although the IMF supplies reserve holdings for nine various 
currencies, I chose to concentrate solely on the dollar and euro shares, as they are the two 
most directly relevant to this topic.  The data is provided as reserve shares in millions of 
dollars; I manipulated this to determine the percentage of total foreign exchange holdings 
held in dollars or euros. 
 
Objective and Regression Method 
The purpose of my work with the foreign exchange holdings of countries around 
the world is to attempt to ascertain the long-run values for both dollar and euro reserves.  
I am interested in finding the relationship between the current amount of reserves held in 
a specific currency and the previous total of reserves maintained in both that currency and 
others.  Specifically, then, how does the proportion of currency reserves held in the 
previous quarter in dollar and euros impact both the share of dollars and euros in the next 
quarter? 
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I present four time series regressions for each the dollar and the euro.  The four 
linear regressions relate the share of dollars to various combinations of lags in the share 
of dollars and euros; the same is then done to relate the share of euros to lags in the share 
of both currencies.  Model 1 shows the relationship between the current share of dollars 
(or euros) and the lag of the same variable.  Model 2 illustrates a similar correlation, but 
this time between the current share of the currency and two of its lags.  Model 3 relates 
the share of dollars (or euros) to a lag in the dollar (or euro) share and to a lag in the euro 
(or dollar) share of reserves.  Model 4 adds an extra lag to each of the currencies. 116 For 
each model, I first consider the significance of each independent variable on the 
dependent variable, then combine these results to explain the model as a whole. 
 
Regression Results 
 Table 3 shows that in the Model 1 regression for dollar shares the coefficient on 
the lagged shares is 0.9474.  This implies that a one percentage point increase in last 
quarter’s share of dollar reserves leads to an almost one percentage point increase in this 
quarter’s share, and vice versa.  A t-statistic of 14.16 makes the variable highly 
statistically significant.  The results are similar in Model 1 for euro shares.  The 
coefficient on the lagged share of euros is 0.9714, again implying that a one percentage 
point increase in last quarter’s share leads to a nearly one percentage point increase in 
this quarter’s share.  The t-statistic for this variable is even higher than that of the dollar 
lag: 22.16.  The adjusted R-squared values for each regression—0.8731 and 0.9441, 
respectively—suggest a reasonably good fit.  The change in the amount of a currency that 
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is held by countries indeed does not appear to fluctuate very drastically from quarter to 
quarter.  As a result, the regressions of Model 1 are helpful in establishing a 
straightforward relationship between a variable and its lag. 
Next, it would be interesting to explore this relationship further and attempt to 
ascertain whether the shares held in even earlier quarters likewise have an effect on the 
current share of a currency.  The Model 2 regressions for both the dollar and euro add a 
second lag of the currency into the model.  And from this it becomes evident that the 
second lag is not as significant.  The t-statistic on the lag2 variables are 0.22 for the dollar 
share and -0.58 for the euro share—very small.  In addition, the t-statistics for the lag1 
variables of the dollar and the euro have drastically declined to 4.71 and 5.61, 
respectively.  The adjusted R-squared value for each of the regressions has also decreased 
slightly.  These qualities seem to suggest that the second lag is a somewhat irrelevant 
variable.   
 Still, it has contributed to a change in the coefficients for the single lag variables.  
Interestingly, that of the dollar has decreased, whereas that of the euro has increased.  
This indicates that with a two-lagged model, last quarter’s share of the dollar has a 
smaller effect on the present share.  But last quarter’s share of the euro has a larger effect 
on the present share.  This may hint at the role of a currency’s incumbency.  The dollar 
has been the dominant currency for a long time, and so the share of dollars held in 
previous quarters will not significantly influence how much of the world’s reserves are 
dollar-denominated.  However, because the euro is a newer currency, the effect of the 
past on the present share of euros is stronger: perhaps countries that were hesitant to 
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diversify into euros are more likely to do so once they have proof that other states have 
been doing so.   
 Of the four models, Model 3 has the best fit.  The R-squared values are the 
highest for both the dollar share and euro share.  The regression on the dollar share shows 
that the lagged share of the dollar does not bear a strong influence on the current amount 
of dollars held as currency reserves.  The coefficient on the lagged variable is only 
0.0261, indicating that a one percentage point increase last quarter would have roughly 
only a 0.03 percentage point positively-related influence on the present quarter.  Further, 
the t-statistic is a low 0.09, indicating that the variable is not initially very significant.  
The lagged euro share, however, is solidly significant with a t-statistic of -3.22 and a 
coefficient of -0.7473.  The implication, then, is that this quarter’s share of dollar reserves 
is more dependent on the share of currency reserves held as euros last quarters than the 
amount held in dollars.   
 This finding may again be the result of the dollar’s already strong position as an 
international currency due to its advantage as a nearly risk-free asset.  Banks and other 
financial actors trust the dollar and will therefore continue to hold a steady amount of it in 
reserves.  Whether slightly less or more dollars were held in the previous quarter will not 
make much difference on the amount held today.  Yet the share of euros from the past 
several months does seem to have an impact.  The relationship is a negative one, 
demonstrating that an increase in the share of euros held last quarter should decrease the 
reserves being held in dollars.  This may indicate that over time, as the euro becomes 
more widely used and reaches greater stability, some banks may choose to diversify away 
from dollars and into euros.   
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The results are slightly different in Model 3 of the share euro reserves.  The 
lagged euro share is very significant with a high t-statistic of 8.10.  The coefficient is 
1.5632; this indicates that a one percentage point increase in last quarter’s share of euros 
would have a one and a half percentage point increase on this quarter’s shares!  Further, 
the coefficient on the lagged dollar share is likewise positive.  It, too, is a significant 
variable, with a t-statistic of 3.13.  The impact on the current share of euros from last 
quarter’s share of dollars is lower than the lagged share of euros, but is nonetheless 
almost 0.76%.  The share of reserves held in euros is therefore dependent on more factors 
than is the dollar. 
 Because the euro has been in circulation for less than even ten years, some banks 
are still wary of holding large reserves of this currency.  This may be one reason why the 
amount held previously can still have such a large effect on present-day shares.  A 
currency that exhibits steadily growing shares as reserves can be considered stable.  
Further, as more banks hold euro reserves, the greater the incentive for other banks to opt 
for it as well: they will be able to carry out transactions with each other more easily if 
they all hold euros.  So as the euro continues to prove itself in the markets, it will gain the 
reputation of being a liquid and stable currency—important characteristics of a currency 
that banks choose to hold as reserves.  The positive relationship of current euro shares on 
lagged dollar shares may be an illustration of the euro’s ability to come to rival the dollar.  
If the share of euros rises along with that of dollars, then banks are diversifying away 
from smaller currencies in favor of the more widely-accepted, international currencies.  
Thus, the two are viewed on a nearly equal level. 
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Finally, Model 4 for the share of both dollars and euros considers whether it 
would be helpful to include the second lags of both currencies.  Unfortunately, the results 
suggest they are not that helpful.  The adjusted R-squared values for both regressions are 
still relatively strong, but this may mostly be due to the larger number of variables used.  
The t-statistics of the dollar share regression are very low for all independent variables, 
and the coefficients are all very close.  The results for the euro share regression are 
somewhat more helpful, with the lagged euro variable demonstrating statistical 
significance, and the lagged dollar nearly doing so as well.  But overall, Model 4 is not as 
useful as Model 3 for explaining the effects on the currency reserve shares of banks. 
 
Analysis 
 To continue with the analysis of the importance of the euro in currency reserve 
shares, I evaluate the long-run values for shares in both dollars and euros using 
coefficients from the regressions explained above.  When the equations are derived from 
Model 1 and Model 2, it is possible to use simple algebra in order to find the long-run 
values.117 Table 4 shows these results.  The values are very close for the dollar share, 
demonstrating that the lagged dollar shares have little impact on the current amount of 
reserves held in dollars.  The values for euro shares vary somewhat between that for one 
lag and that for two lags.  This implies, again, that the amount of shares held in previous 
quarters influences the current share.  Although the dollar shares of approximately 65% 
are closer to the latest actual reported current amount held as reserves, the euro shares of 
 
117 From the equation for one lag dollar shares: Yt = U + WYt-1, Y = U/(1-W); and Yt = U + WYt-1 + XYt-2,
Y = U/(1-W-X).  Similarly, for one lag euro shares: Xt = Z + [Xt-1, X = Z/(1-[); and Xt = Z + [Xt-1 + \Xt-2,
X = Z/(1-[-\). 
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about 28% are slightly higher.118 Based on their histories alone, the shares of dollars are 
expected to remain relatively the same, while those of euros are expected to grow 
significantly.  Thus, this simple analysis leads to the conclusion that the euro will slowly 
grow to become a strong rival for the dollar.   
 Using the coefficients from Model 3 and Model 4, it is possible to analyze the 
shares of currency currently held in reserves based on the impact of other currencies as 
well, and thereby calculate the steady-state of the system.  There are several ways to 
perform the computation, for example again algebraically or with the use of matrices.  
However, once one or more lags are added into this system of equations, the use of the 
matrix becomes the most efficient method, since the calculations follow the same pattern 
with the addition of each lag and are simpler to compute. 
 The two equations used to calculate the steady-state system, with all lags119, are as 
follows: 
 Yt = * + ,Yt-1 + /Yt-2 + 1X t-1 + 3X t-2 (1) 
 
Xt = 4 + 5X t-1 + 6X t-2 + 7Y t-1 + 8Y t-2 (2) 
 
The first equation relates the shares of dollars at time t (Yt) to the two lagged dollar shares 
at times t-1 and t-2 (Yt-1 and Yt-2) and to the two lagged euro shares also at times t-1 and t-
2 (Xt-1 and Xt-2).  The second equation is similar, with share of euros at time t (Xt) as the 
dependent variable.  The system is solved by finding the long-run values for the share of 
dollars and the share of euros.  To do this, it must be re-written in matrix form: 
 
118 The third quarter, 2006, data reports dollar shares as 65.2131% and euro shares as 25.22248% (IMF 
COFER Tables). 
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Yt * , 1 Yt-1 / 3 Yt-2 
= + +
Xt 4 7 5 Xt-1 8 6 Xt-2 
Zt A B C
With the equations in matrix form, it becomes simple to find the values for X and Y at 
time t (they are now Zt) with the following equation: 
 Zt = A + BZt-1 + CZt-2 (3) 
In order to find the long-run values, rather than simply the values at time t, equation 3 can 
be re-written as: 
 Z = (I – B – C)-1·A (4) 
where I is the 2x2 identity matrix.  When the inverse is multiplied by the values of A, two 
numbers emerge.  These are the long-run shares of dollar and euros. 
 The results with one time lag, as shown in Table 4, are nearly 65% of shares in 
dollars and 26% of shares in euros.  The dollar is clearly leading, but the euro is not very 
far behind.  It is a sizeable competitor for the dollar, one that the world has not seen for a 
long time.120 The dollar obviously does have the advantage of incumbency.  But based 
on its history as well, the euro is expected to remain strong.  As has been mentioned 
 
119 For the sake of not repeating similar equations, I demonstrate here only the case with two lags, as it is 
longest and the most complex.  The one lag calculations were performed by simply omitting components 
with t-2 variables in the equation and the values denoted by C in the matrix.  
120 The pound sterling, once also a global currency, in the third quarter f 2006, comprised only 2.32508% of 
the reserve shares of all countries (IMF COFER Tables). 
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earlier, the more the euro is used, the lower will be the transactions costs for it and the 
greater will be the demand for euros as reserves as other banks increase their holdings.     
 Once the second lag is added, the share of dollars increases to about 66% and the 
share of euros falls to slightly under 25%.  The further back one explores the shares of 
euros, clearly the lower the long-run number will be—as a fledgling currency, the euro 
was not widely held as a reserve currency for several years.  The dollar, by contrast, was 
held in larger amounts than it currently is.  This accounts for the variations in results from 
one lag to two lags.  But it may in fact be this finding that suggests the euro’s strength.  
Since the long-run values for the two-lag model are slightly lower than the observed 
ones, then it is possible that the euro is already enjoying an increased international role, 
which is simply not yet reflected by the steady-state system described above.  It may be 
“punching above its weight.”121 It may also be the case that the euro’s increased 
international presence comes at the expense of other currencies, such as the yen or the 
pound sterling, rather than specifically the dollar, especially since the long-term values 
for the latter are close to the observed.  
 Until somewhat recently, the European Union’s economy has actually been 
reported as not doing as well as that of the United States: “GDP per head in the euro area 
is almost 30% lower than in America, and the gap is widening: the OECD reckons that 
trend growth per person is only about 1.5% a year, compared with America’s 2%.”122 
Productivity growth has been slower in Europe (and speeding up in the US), and 
unemployment has been higher for some time.  Yet regardless of this, the euro has 
successfully continued to slowly, but steadily, increase its potency as a reserve currency. 
 
121 Portes et al, 2006, 1. 
122 The Economist, 2007, “The quest for prosperity.” 
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One of the most important reasons behind the dollar’s strength has been somewhat 
illusory confidence in the prowess of America’s economy, on the “widespread belief that 
the American economy vastly outperformed the world’s other rich-country economies in 
recent years.”  In truth, an article from The Economist argues, “the figures do not support 
the hype.”123 Most of the rapid GDP growth in the United States has been due to its 
faster-growing population relative to the European Union, as well as longer working 
hours and differences in measurement.124 
One would have expected the shares of the euro as a reserve currency to have 
remained low when the EU’s economy was not faring as well as that of the United States.  
Instead, they stayed strong.  Now, as the euro area’s economic growth improves and 
reaches a sustainable rate, it is only expected that the euro will easily reach the reserve 
share amounts projected in the calculations above, if not surpass them altogether.  The 
results demonstrate that if the euro continues at this steady pace, more and more banks 
will choose to hold more of their reserves in euros.  The share of dollars is not projected 
as falling, but it will mostly likely not grow by any significant amount, and may in fact 
decrease somewhat if banks give up dollar reserves in favor of euro ones.  From the long-
run results of currency reserves regression analysis it is evident that the euro is not likely 
to slump as a key reserve currency.  
 
Exchange Rate 
 Another topic often brought up in literature concerning the euro/dollar correlation 
is the exchange rate between the two currencies.  As mentioned earlier, one of the 
 
123The Economist, 2006, “The falling dollar.”  
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European Central Bank’s main concerns is monetary stability.  This includes steadiness 
in the exchange rate.  A strong exchange rate will help to avoid capital losses for those 
who hold euro-denominated assets.125 This includes central banks that hold euros as their 
foreign currency reserves.  Therefore, there is a relation between the exchange rate of a 
currency and the amount of it held as reserves. 
 
Objective and Regression Method 
Having considered regressions determining a currency’s share held as currency 
reserves, I now turn to variables influencing the exchange rate.  Clearly, exchange rates 
are by their nature extremely volatile and difficult to predict.  Nevertheless, I attempt 
several versions of a forecasting regression. There are many variables that impact 
exchange rates.  But in keeping with regressions done above, I have chosen to 
concentrate on the lagged exchange rate, as well as lagged shares of each dollar and euro 
reserves.  The forecasting regressions attempt to determine whether changes in the 
amount of a currency held by the public sector as reserves have a statistically significant 
impact on the appreciation of the currency. 
 Model 1126 relates the change in the exchange rate127 to a lag in the exchange rate, 
as well as a lag in the dollar share of currency reserves and a lag in the euro share.  Model 
2 drops lags in the euro shares, and concentrates solely on the impact dollar shares have 
on the exchange rate.  Model 3 is similar, but looks only at the euro shares.  Model 4 
combines all variables.  As with the models for shares in currency reserves, in the four 
 
124 The Economist, 2007, “The quest for prosperity.” 
125 Frieden, 2000, 204. 
126 See Appendix, Table 5. 
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exchange rate models, I will first consider the impact of each independent variable on the 
dependent variable, and will then combine these points to explain the model as a whole. 
 
Regression Results 
Model 1 appears to have some of the most significant variables.  The adjusted R-
squared is low—only 0.3320.  This is a reinforcement of the unpredictability of the 
exchange rate.  Although it is possible to consider various variables that may exhibit 
impacts on it, it is nevertheless impossible to correctly predict future exchange rates.  
Obviously, if it were indeed feasible, many high profits would already have been made of 
the process.  The t-statistic on the first independent variable—the lagged exchange rate—
is low.  It is higher for the other two variables, however.  From this first regression, it 
appears that both the dollar and euro shares have an effect on the change in the exchange 
rate.  Both are negatively related and have coefficients close to 0.05.  This implies that a 
one percentage point increase in the share of dollars would have a 0.0532 percentage 
point decrease in the change in the exchange rate; an increase in the share of euros would 
lead to a 0.0475 percentage point decrease in the exchange rate.  The fact that the 
coefficients are so low indicates the difference in the lag of changes in the exchange rate 
and in currency reserves.  There are generally no sudden, large changes in currency 
reserves in the short run.  Thus, any modifications in the exchange rate due to the share of 
reserves are disbursed over a longer period of time and therefore have a smaller impact in 
the short run. 
 
127 Exchange rate values relate the number of euros given for one dollar for each quarter from 1999-2006.  
Source: FXHistory from Oanda.com: The Currency Site, as of November 2006.   
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Both the share of dollars and the share of euros are negatively related to changes 
in the exchange rate in Model 1.  A positive change in the exchange rate denotes a 
depreciation of the euro, whereas a negative change indicates an appreciation of the 
currency.  Thus, an increase in euro reserves leads to a negative change in the exchange 
rate and therefore signifies an appreciation of the euro.  This follows the idea that a 
strong exchange rate is stable and so encourages private actors to hold more of their 
assets in euros.  Interestingly, the share of dollars is also negatively related.  This may be 
explained, once again, by the incumbency of the dollar.  Although an increase in dollar 
reserves leads to a depreciation of the dollar, it still remains a strong currency.  Banks 
will continue to hold reserves of it, even if the exchange rate varies slightly. 
 Model 2 focuses even more on the historical aspect of the dollar.  As was 
demonstrated in the regressions on currency reserves, adding a second lag does not 
necessarily provide more accurate results.  In this case, the t-statistics for the lagged 
dollar share variables are relatively low, especially that of one lag.  This is, again, most 
likely the result of the slower changeover process in currency reserves relative to that of 
the exchange rate.  The coefficients on the dollar lag variables are positive.  An increase 
in dollar share results in a positive change in the exchange, which, in turn, signifies an 
appreciation of the dollar.  The lagged exchange rate now exhibits a higher t-statistic, 
making it more statistically significant.  The negative coefficient is the result of its 
inherent relationship to the change in the exchange rate following its derivation.128 
Model 3 turns instead to the share of euros as reserves.  The lagged exchange rate 
again has a significant t-statistic and the coefficient is negative, just as in the previous 
 
128 ?Et = (Et – Et-1) / Et-1. Thus, if Et-1 increases, the numerator decreases, while the denominator increases, 
causing the change in the exchange rate to decrease—a negative relationship. 
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regression.  The signs on the euro lag coefficients, however, vary.  That for one lag is 
positive, while that for the second becomes negative.  Interestingly, the one-lag 
coefficients are very close for both the euro and the dollar (from Model 2).  Their t-
statistics are exactly the same.  This would imply that when only one currency is 
concerned, they have a similar impact on the change in the exchange rate—almost as 
though the two currencies are on equal footing.  The negative coefficient on the second 
euro lag can be explained in the similar way that the lagged euro was justified in the first 
regression.  But the suddenly positive coefficient on the one-lag variable may suggest the 
explanation of the dollar share in Model 1—the euro’s increasing role as a reserve 
currency indicates that even though its exchange rate may be low, banks will still be 
willing to hold it as reserves, simply because of the benefits. 
 Model 4 exhibits no significant t-statistics.  The R-squared is the second-highest 
of the four, but as in the regressions for the currency reserves, this may be due largely to 
the increased number of variables included.  This is not a very good fit model.  Clearly, 
of the four regressions, Model 1 exhibits the most interesting results.  It is certainly 
obvious from at least Models 1, 2, and 3, however, that there is definitely a connection 
between exchange rates and currency reserves. 
 
Analysis 
Exchange rates are naturally volatile.  It is typically impossible to predict a future 
exchange rate.129 Similarly, because of the lack of pattern, it is difficult to find a distinct 
relationship between a currency’s exchange rate relative to other currency and the amount 
 
129 See Appendix, Figure 2. 
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of it held as reserves in countries’ central banks.  As evidenced by the regression results 
explained above, certain generalizations may be made, but it is nearly unfeasible to 
expound on conclusive facts that will be correct every time: 
The long-term experience with the dollar as a reserve currency 
shows that there is a long-term correlation between the 
development of the exchange rate and the dollar’s use as 
international reserve currency. … But the euro did not follow the 
simple rule that a weak exchange rate automatically means losing 
ground as a reserve currency.  Even when the euro was weak 
between 1999 and 2001, its share as a reserve currency increased 
from 17.9% to almost 20%.130 
Even though the exchange rate was low, there were enough countries that were confident 
in the euro to invest in it despite the lackluster record. 
 An important aspect to note of the euro exchange rate relative to other nations is 
that about 50 small and medium-sized countries currently “peg” their currencies to the 
euro.131 This means they fix their domestic exchange rate to that of the euro.  Although 
this is the unit of account role of international money, rather than the medium of 
exchange function, it nonetheless has an impact on currency reserves.  In order to help 
boost confidence in their own currency, these countries must hold official euro reserves 
in their central banks.  These greater reserves will then increase confidence in the 
countries’ exchange rate policy as well.  Though most countries choosing to peg to the 
euro are new EU member states or from the neighboring areas, some other nations use the 
euro in their basket peg.  These are countries with substantial reserve holdings and are 
outside the European “sphere of influence”, such as Russia and Libya.132 It is an 
 
130 Walter, 2005, 6. 
131 Walter, 2005, 5. 
132 Portes et al, 2006, 12. 
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important indicator of the euro’s strength if large countries such as these hold euro 
reserves.  
 These larger countries, because of their considerable economies, are able to exert 
some influence on the exchange rate through their reserve holdings.  As evidenced from 
Model 1 discussed above, shares of currency reserves do have some impact on the change 
in a currency’s exchange rate.  And thus if a currency is depreciating or otherwise 
demonstrating signs of weakness, these countries’ central banks can intervene to 
influence the exchange rate.  This has occurred before, such as in the mid-1990s when the 
dollar was weak and “G-7 central banks intervened and increased the market share of the 
dollar in their official reserves.”133 Further, when public and private investors choose the 
currency compositions of their portfolios, they tend to take into account both actual and 
expected exchange rates.  But even in this situation, the exchange rate would have a very 
significant effect only in extreme circumstances. 
 Although the stability of the exchange rate is certainly an important characteristic 
of an international currency, it is not one of its main determinants.  As it was mentioned 
earlier, the high volatility of exchange rates and their lack of predictability make them 
less important in long-term changes.  In fact, Paul Masson and Bart Turtelboom conclude 
also from their research that dollar reserves would not be “a major influence on the 
exchange rate between the euro and the dollar, which is more likely to be influenced by 
the relative stance of monetary policies, relative cyclical positions, and policy 
credibility.”134 And as evidenced by the exchange rate regressions presented above, the 
exchange rate is clearly not very largely influenced by currency reserves in general.  
 
133 Boissieu, 2000, 257.  
134 Masson, 1997, 218. 
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Historic examples support these findings.  The dollar—a widely-accepted international 
currency—did not witness a significant fall in its market shares when it experienced 
periods of weakness in the 1970s.  And the euro, though somewhat weaker than expected 
after its launch, does not seem to have jeopardized its role in the international monetary 
system.135 
Conclusions from Empirical Evidence 
The results of the above empirical research indicate that the euro has indeed 
become a strong competitor to the dollar in the area of foreign currency reserve holdings, 
and that the shares of euros should not decline at any point in the near future.  Further, the 
exchange rate, though an important attribute to the euro’s position as an international 
currency, is no longer greatly affected by the changes in the euro’s share as a reserve 
currency.  Investors and banks will most likely continue to increase their reserve holdings 
and strengthen the euro’s role as a global currency.  To this end, it is useful to consider 
the recent conditions of the world economy and to what extent this environment will 
continue to sustain a multiple reserves system. 
A main concern of economists at the present time involves the issue of the 
increasing international debt and deficit problems of the United States.  This connects to 
earlier discussion on the amount of a currency held as reserves.  More specifically, as 
Chinn and Frankel explain, the role of currency as a reserve currency “is [one of the 
 
135 Boissieu, 2000, 257. 
51
most] relevant…to the important questions of whether the United States will continue to 
be able to finance its current account deficit.”136 
The reserve currency status of the dollar allows the United States to take 
advantage of what is known as the “exorbitant privilege.”  Countries whose currencies 
are not widely held as reserves have what is known as a “hard” balance of payments 
constraint; they must strictly monitor the balance between their assets and liabilities.  But 
those countries whose currencies act as major reserve currencies—such as the United 
States—boast a “soft” balance of payments constraint, meaning they can allow liabilities 
denominated in their currency “to accumulate rather than use gold or foreign exchange 
assets.”137 These countries are able to run very large and extended current account 
deficits by financing them with their own currency.138 
The US current account deficit, as of the fourth quarter of 2006, is recorded at 
$856.7 billion.  This is 6.1% of total 2007 GDP.139 The “exorbitant privilege” effect 
furnishes the United States with quite a substantial increase in power in the short run.  In 
the long run, however, a temptation presents itself, which “if…not accompanied by fiscal 
discipline…will be used as a way of building up…a substantial increase in 
indebtedness.”140 Investors will become wary of the currency if this continues for too 
long.  “The key question is therefore whether international investors will still accept 
taking capital losses on their dollar holdings and keep financing the US current account 
deficits at a low cost to the United States, as they currently do, or whether they will shift 
 
136 Chinn, 2006, 5. 
137 Mundell, 2000, 70. 
138 Portes et al, 2006, 26. 
139 The Economist, Economic and financial indicators, April 2007. 
140 Mundell, 2000, 71. 
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their wealth toward more stable nominal assets.”141 Further, as the US maintains its 
deficit, the dollar depreciates.  As was evidenced by the empirical research presented in 
this paper, this will not have that significant of an effect in the short run.  In the long run, 
however, it is possible that investors will begin to diversify their wealth out of dollars. 
The instability of the dollar, caused mainly by the US current account deficit, may 
trigger portfolio shifts out of the dollar and into other currencies.  As the strongest 
currency after the dollar, the euro may be the investors’ next choice.  Due to its position 
as a main counterpart currency in the international monetary system, the euro stands to 
appreciate further.  This will increase further the euro’s stability and will likely spur a 
greater shift of currency reserves in favor of the euro.  Thus, the sustainability of the US 
current account deficit is mainly contingent on two factors.  First, on how much longer 
foreign central banks will continue to intervene in the foreign exchange market to keep 
the dollar’s exchange rate strong.  And second, on whether the banks will consider it 
more profitable to shift the bulk of their reserves away from dollars and into rival 
currencies.142 Perhaps if the US current account deficit were also somehow taken into 
consideration in the above model of the steady-state system of currency reserves, the 
results would have revealed a dollar with some trouble in retaining its share so solidly. 
 
141 Rey, 2005, 115. 
142 Chinn, 2006, 6. 
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CONCLUSION 
This paper has considered the possibility that the euro will come to challenge the 
dollar as an alternative international currency.  Several factors indicate that this is, in fact, 
a very plausible situation.  The economies of the United States and the euro area are the 
largest in the world.  The euro has demonstrated solid performance in the financial 
markets, which continue to become better developed and more liquid.  The European 
Central Bank’s emphasis on price stability lends more credibility to the euro, improving 
investors’ confidence in the currency.   
 As the econometric evidence in this paper has shown, countries’ central banks are 
increasingly turning to the euro as their choice of reserve currency.  The share of euros is 
growing (it has increased by 0.55% between the first and third quarters of 2006 alone). 
The share of dollars is either stagnant or even declining (there has been a 0.72% drop in 
dollar share between the first and third quarter of 2006).  Long-run values indicate that 
the increase in the share of euros will persist, averaging around 26%.  In fact, the 
estimated shares are nearly equal to those currently observed (25.22% in the third quarter 
of 2006), indicating that the euro may already be enjoying an increased international role.  
In addition, low coefficients in the exchange rate models demonstrate that the exchange 
rate does not fluctuate much as a result of currency reserves.  The confidence of banks in 
the euro appears to be resilient, and they will continue to increase their euro reserves.  
The share of euros—though not as high as that of the dollar—is steadily expanding. 
 It is important to acknowledge that although the euro performed well since its 
launch, there are still several factors that will affect its future accomplishments.  The 
ECB must adopt a more resolute stance on whether or not it will encourage the use of the 
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euro as an international currency.  Next, countries within the euro zone must be less 
hesitant to embrace their new currency.  To that extent, the inclusion of those EU 
members choosing to remain outside the euro area—specifically the United Kingdom—
will bring greater credibility to the euro.  Furthermore, the condition of the US balance of 
payments will have an effect on the euro.  If the current account deficit remains high, 
investors may opt to diversify out of the dollar in favor of the euro.  Already, large 
countries, such as Russia, are choosing to hold a substantial share of their reserves in 
euros.  It would be interesting and helpful to conduct future econometric research that 
would incorporate these factors.  
 In a relatively short period of time, the euro has become an important contender in 
the international monetary system.  It has undoubtedly attained the status of an 
international currency, and therefore, the first real challenge to the dollar.  It still remains 
to be seen whether the extent of its use over the next several years will be enough to 
overwhelm the use of the dollar. 
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APPENDIX—TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1: 
Fixed Euro Conversion Rates 
 
1 euro 
= 40.3399 Belgian Franc 
=1.95583    German Mark 
=166.386    Spanish Peseta 
=6.55957    French Franc 
=340.750    Greek Drachma 
=0.787564  Irish Pound 
=1,936.27   Italian Lira 
=40.3399    Luxembourg Franc 
=2.20371    Dutch Guilder 
=13.7603    Austrian Schilling 
=200.482    Portuguese Escudo 
=5.94573    Finnish Markka 
=239.640    Slovenian Tolar (as of 1/1/07) 
Source: Europa, “The Euro: Our Currency”. 
 
Table 2: 
Roles of an International Currency 
 
Private Official 
Medium of exchange Vehicle Intervention 
Unit of account Invoice Peg 
Store of value Banking Reserve 









































































Regression Results: Currency Reserve Shares 
 
Period: quarterly data, 1999-2006 
Dependent Variable: dollar 

























eurolag2  -0.423829 
[-0.70] 
Number of obs 30 29 30 29 
Adj R2 0.8731 0.8696 0.9049 0.8961 
Dependent Variable: euro 



























Number of obs 30 29 30 29 
Adj R2 0.9441 0.9421 0.9575 0.9531 
Source: See text. 




Long-Run Equilibrium Results 
 
Dollar Share (%) Euro Share (%) 
Dollars only one lag 65.37580207 - 
two lags 65.21090916 - 
Euros only one lag - 29.88321038 
two lags - 27.15699277 
Dollars and 
euros one lag 64.97707639 26.41928831 
Dollars and 































































Regression Results: Exchange Rate 
 
Period: quarterly data, 1999-2006 
Dependent Variable: change in exchange rate (xrchange) 





































Number of obs 30 29 29 29 
Adj R2 0.3320 0.1008 0.2394 0.2940 
Source: See text. 
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